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Abstract
The nonmonotonic causal logic defined in this paper can be used to represent properties of
actions, including actions with conditional and indirect effects, nondeterministic actions, and
concurrently executed actions. It has been applied to several challenge problems in the theory of
commonsense knowledge. We study the relationship between this formalism and other work on
nonmonotonic reasoning and knowledge representation, and discuss its implementation, called the
Causal Calculator.
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1. Introduction
The problem of describing changes caused by the execution of actions is as old as logic-
based Artificial Intelligence. In the “advice taker” paper by John McCarthy [27], effects of
actions are described by first-order formulas, such as
did(go(desk, car,walking))⊃ at(I, car).
Several other approaches to describing effects of actions have been proposed later,
including the situation calculus [26], the STRIPS language [9] and the event calculus [16].
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A large body of research has been devoted to the frame problem—the problem
of describing what does not change when actions are performed [40]. This work has
led to the emergence of several formal theories of nonmonotonic reasoning, including
circumscription [28,29] and default logic [36].
Several researchers addressed the frame problem by distinguishing between causal and
noncausal propositions. When we say that E is an effect of an action A, we assert not only
a material implication (“if A has just been executed then E holds”) but also the existence
of a causal relationship between A and E (“the execution of A causes E”). In the natural
sciences, it is common practice to disregard distinctions like this. In AI, surprisingly, formal
theories of causal reasoning that stress this distinction have turned out to be quite useful.
The causal theory of actions presented in this paper takes its origin in the nonmonotonic
causal logic introduced by McCain and Turner [24]. An implementation of this approach
to actions, called the Causal Calculator (CCALC),1 has been applied to several challenge
problems in the theory of commonsense knowledge [3,18,19]. The companion paper [1]
shows how the language of CCALC can be used to describe two commonsense domains
due to Erik Sandewall.
In this causal logic, we distinguish between being true and having a cause, but we do
not attempt to talk about what a cause may be. Strictly speaking, there is no way to express
in our formal notation that the execution of an action A is the cause for E; what we write
instead is that there exists a cause for E if A has just been executed. Syntactically, this can
be expressed by combining material implication ⊃ with a modal operator C that is used to
express the existence of a cause:
A⊃ CE (1)
[10,44]. The syntax defined in this paper is more limited. We use “causal rules” of the form
F ⇐G
where F and G are formulas of classical logic, in place of the combination
G⊃ CF
(“there is a cause for F to be true if G is true”). In particular, we can express that there is
a cause for F to be true by writing the causal rule
F ⇐.
The noncausal assertion that F is true can be expressed by
⊥⇐¬F.
(Symbols  and ⊥ are 0-place propositional connectives.) Expression (1) can be written
as the causal rule
E⇐A.
We will define a causal theory to be a set of causal rules.
1 http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/ccalc/.
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Our semantics of causal theories can be informally summarized as follows: every fact
that is caused obtains, and vice versa. This assertion is made precise in Proposition 1
(Section 2.3). Its second half—every fact that obtains is caused—expresses the “principle
of universal causation”, a rather strong philosophical commitment that is rewarded by
mathematical simplicity in the semantics of causal theories. We will soon see how the
principle of universal causation can be “disabled” for selected formulas.
To illustrate the idea of universal causation, we will show how to use it, in an informal
way, to find the models of a simple causal theory. Take the following example:
p⇐ q,
q⇐ q, (2)
¬q⇐¬q.
Here p, q are atoms. Which interpretations (that is, truth-valued functions on {p,q}) are
models of (2)?
Causal rules (2) assert that, under various conditions, there is a cause for p, there is a
cause for q , and there is a cause for ¬q . But no rule in (2) may lead to the conclusion that
there is a cause for ¬p. Consequently,
¬p is not caused.
Since we require that every true formula be caused, we can conclude that
¬p is not true
or, equivalently,
p is true.
Again because every true formula is caused, it must be the case that
p is caused.
The only way to use rules (2) to establish that p is caused is to refer to rule p⇐ q , which
says: p is caused if q is true. Consequently,
q is true.
This informal argument shows that the interpretation making both p and q true is the
only possible model of (2). And it is indeed a model, because, under this interpretation, the
first two rules of (2) guarantee the existence of causes both for p and for q .
The last two rules of (2) illustrate the point made above about relaxing the principle of
universal causation—they “disable” it for formula q . These rules express that if q is true
then there is a cause for this, and, on the other hand, if q is false then there is a cause for
that.
In the next section, we define the semantics of causal theories and study the special
case of “definite” theories. In Section 3 we show how to use definite theories to describe
action domains; the Monkey and Bananas problem2 is used as the main example. “Causal
2 A monkey wants to get a bunch of bananas hanging from the ceiling. He can reach the bananas by first
pushing a box to the empty place under the bananas and then climbing on top of the box.
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laws”—higher-level notation for describing actions, similar to the action language C
from [13]—are introduced in Section 4, and further examples illustrating the expressive
possibilities of definite causal laws are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 is a brief
introduction to the input language of CCALC. In Section 7 we compare this work
with other research on nonmonotonic reasoning and knowledge representation. Proofs
of theorems are presented in Section 8. We conclude by discussing the relation of this
work to the idea of elaboration tolerance [31]. Appendix A relates formulas of “multi-
valued propositional signatures” used in the main part of the paper to usual propositional
formulas. Appendix B is a list of useful abbreviations for special kinds of causal
laws.
2. Causal theories
2.1. Formulas
The class of formulas defined below is similar to the class of propositional formulas,
but a little bit more general: we will allow atomic parts of a formula to be equalities of
the kind found in constraint satisfaction problems. This is convenient when formulas are
used to talk about states of a system. For instance, to describe the location of a person in
an apartment, we can use equalities like
Loc= Kitchen, Loc= LivingRoom, Loc= Bathroom, Loc= Bedroom.
The effect of walking to the kitchen can be described by saying that it makes the first of
these atomic formulas true, so that the others become false.
A (multi-valued propositional) signature is a set σ of symbols called constants, along
with a nonempty finite set Dom(c) of symbols, disjoint from σ , assigned to each constant c.
We call Dom(c) the domain of c. An atom of a signature σ is an expression of the form
c= v (“the value of c is v”) where c ∈ σ and v ∈ Dom(c). A formula of σ is a propositional
combination of atoms.
To distinguish formulas of the usual propositional logic from formulas of a multi-valued
signature, we will call them “classical”.
An interpretation of σ is a function that maps every element of σ to an element of its
domain. An interpretation I satisfies an atom c= v (symbolically, I |= c= v) if I (c)= v.
The satisfaction relation is extended from atoms to arbitrary formulas according to the
usual truth tables for the propositional connectives.
The following definitions are standard in logic. A model of a set X of formulas is an
interpretation that satisfies all formulas in X. If X has a model, it is said to be consistent,
or satisfiable. If every model of X satisfies a formula F then we say that X entails F and
write X |= F . Two sets of formulas are equivalent to each other if they have the same
models.
A Boolean constant is one whose domain is the set {f, t} of truth values. A Boolean
signature is one whose constants are Boolean. If c is a Boolean constant, we will sometimes
use c as shorthand for the atom c= t. When the syntax and semantics defined above are
restricted to Boolean signatures and to formulas that do not contain f, they turn into the
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usual syntax and semantics of classical propositional formulas. Checking satisfiability (and
entailment) for formulas of a multi-valued propositional signature can be easily reduced to
the satisfiability problem for the classical case, as discussed in Appendix A.
Recall that, according to the definition, an atom is an equality whose left-hand side is a
constant c, and whose right-hand side is an element of the domain of c. An expression of
the form c = d , where both c and d are constants, will be understood as an abbreviation
for the disjunction∨
v∈Dom(c)∩Dom(d)
(c= v ∧ d = v).
The symbol = will be used to abbreviate the negation of an equality of either kind.
For example, consider the use of a multi-valued signature to describe possible states in
the Monkey and Bananas problem. A state can be described by specifying
• the current locations of the monkey, the bananas, and the box,
• whether or not the monkey is on the box, and
• whether or not the monkey has the bananas.
Assume that the possible locations of the monkey, the bananas, and the box are L1,L2,L3.
A signature that would allow us to talk about states consists of the constants
Loc(x) (x ∈ {Monkey,Bananas,Box}) (3)
whose domain is {L1,L2,L3}, and the Boolean constants
HasBananas, OnBox. (4)
This signature has 33 · 22 interpretations. The interpretations that satisfy
HasBananas⊃ Loc(Monkey)= Loc(Bananas)
and
OnBox⊃ Loc(Monkey)= Loc(Box)
represent the possible states of the system.
2.2. Causal rules: syntax
Begin with a multi-valued propositional signature σ . By a (causal) rule we mean an
expression of the form F ⇐G (“F is caused if G is true”), where F and G are formulas
of σ , called the head and the body of the rule. Rules with the head ⊥ are called constraints.
A causal theory is a set of causal rules.
The examples below come from the representation of the Monkey and Bananas domain
that will be discussed in Section 3.2. Since that theory deals with a sequence s0, . . . , sm of
states rather than an individual state, the supply of constants used in these rules is richer
than the signature introduced in Section 2.1. For a fixed nonnegative integer m—the length
of “histories” that we want to describe—introduce m + 1 copies of the constants in that
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signature, one corresponding to the each of the states si . Each copy is formed by putting a
“time stamp” i : in front of each of the constants:
i :Loc(x), i :HasBananas, i :OnBox (5)
(x ∈ {Monkey,Bananas,Box}; i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}). We also need Boolean constants represent-
ing the execution of actions:
i :Walk(l) (6)
(expressing that between states si and si+1 the monkey walks to location l),
i :PushBox(l) (7)
(the monkey pushes the box to location l), and
i :ClimbOn, i :ClimbOff , i :GraspBananas, (8)
where l ∈ {L1,L2,L3} and i ∈ {0, . . . ,m − 1}.3 Intuitively, a function mapping con-
stants (6)–(8) to truth values is understood as the execution of all actions that are mapped
to t; the actions with the same time stamp i are executed concurrently.
The effects of actions can be described by rules such as
i + 1:Loc(Monkey)= l⇐ i :Walk(l), (9)
i + 1:HasBananas⇐ i :GraspBananas.
For instance, the last rule says that there is a cause for the monkey to have the bananas in
state si+1 if he grasped the bananas between states si and si+1.
Restrictions on the executability of actions can be described by constraints, for instance:
⊥⇐ i :(GraspBananas∧¬OnBox), (10)⊥⇐ i :(GraspBananas∧ Loc(Monkey) = Loc(Bananas)).
In the bodies of the last two rules, we use the following convention:
i :(F ∧G)
stands for
(i :F)∧ (i :G)
and similarly for the other propositional connectives.
2.3. Causal rules: semantics
Now we will show how to extend the concept of a model, defined in Section 2.1 for sets
of formulas, to sets of causal rules.
3 The action of climbing off the box is not required to solve the traditional form of the Monkey and Bananas
problem, but is included in the version of the domain discussed in this paper. It is needed, for instance, if the
monkey wants to bring the bananas back to his original location.
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Let T be a causal theory, and let I be an interpretation of its signature. The reduct T I
of T relative to I is the set of the heads of all rules in T whose bodies are satisfied by I .
We say that I is a model of T if I is the unique model of T I .
Intuitively, T I is the set of formulas that are caused, according to the rules of T , under
interpretation I . If this set has no models or more than one model, then, according to the
definition above, I is not considered a model of T . If T I has exactly one model, but that
model is different from I , then I is not a model of T either. The only case when I is a
model of T is when I satisfies every formula in the reduct, and no other interpretation
does.
If a causal theory T has a model, we say that it is consistent, or satisfiable. If every
model of T satisfies a formula F then we say that T entails F and write T |= F .
As an example, take
σ = {c}, Dom(c)= {1, . . . , n}
for some positive integer n, and let the only rule of T be
c= 1⇐ c= 1. (11)
The interpretation I defined by I (c)= 1 is a model of T . Indeed,
T I = {c= 1},
so that I is the only model of T I . Furthermore, T has no other models. Indeed, for any
interpretation J such that J (c) = 1, T J is empty, and I is a model of T J different from J .
It follows that causal theory (11) entails c= 1.
Consider now what happens if we add the rule
c= 2⇐ (12)
to this theory. The reduct of the extended theory relative to any interpretation includes the
atom c= 2. Consequently, the interpretation assigning 2 to c is the only possible model of
the extended theory. It is easy to see that this is indeed a model.
The extended theory does not entail c = 1; it entails c = 2. This example shows that
the logic introduced above is nonmonotonic. Intuitively, rule (11) expresses that 1 is “the
default value” of c, and rule (12) overrides this default.
If the rule
c= 2⇐ c= 2 (13)
is added to (11) instead of (12), we will get a causal theory with two models. This theory
entails c= 1∨ c= 2.
Let us apply the definition of a model to the causal theory T with rules (2), assuming
that the Boolean constants p, q are the only elements of the underlying signature. Consider,
one by one, all interpretations of that signature:
• I1(p) = I1(q) = t. The reduct consists of the heads of the first two rules of (2):
T I1 = {p,q}. Since I1 is the unique model of T I1 , it is a model of T .
• I2(p) = f, I2(q) = t. The reduct is the same as above, and I2 is not a model of the
reduct. Consequently, I2 is not a model of T .
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• I3(p)= t, I3(q)= f. The only element of the reduct is the head of the third rule of (2):
T I3 = {¬q}. It has 2 models. Consequently, I3 is not a model of T .
• I4(p) = I4(q) = f. The reduct is the same as above, so that I4 is not a model of T
either.
We see that I1 is the only model of T .
In the discussion of each of the examples above, it was essential that the underlying
signature does not include any constants that do not occur in the rules. Adding a constant
to the signature of a causal theory without adding any rules containing that constant in the
head would render the theory inconsistent (unless the domain of the new constant was a
singleton).
The following proposition provides an alternative characterization of the semantics of
causal theories:
Proposition 1. An interpretation I is a model of a causal theory T if and only if for every
formula F ,
I |= F iff T I |= F.
In particular, we see that in a model I of a causal theory, every fact that obtains is
caused, in the sense that every formula satisfied by I is entailed by the set of formulas
caused under I according to the rules of the theory. This assertion is a precise form of the
principle of universal causation discussed in the introduction.
The following fact relates causal rules to corresponding material implications:
Proposition 2. If a causal theory T contains a causal rule F ⇐G then T entails G⊃ F .
The satisfiability problem for multi-valued propositional formulas clearly belongs to
class NP. The semantics of causal theories is apparently more complex:
Proposition 3. The problem of determining that a finite causal theory is consistent is P2 -
complete.
In Section 2.6 we define a special kind of causal theories for which the satisfiability
problem is in class NP.
2.4. Equivalent transformations of causal theories
A negated atom c = v is equivalent to the disjunction∨
w∈Dom(c)\{v}
c=w.
Consequently, any formula of a multi-valued propositional signature can be rewritten in
“positive disjunctive normal form”—as a disjunction of conjunctions of atoms. Similarly,
any such formula is equivalent to a conjunction of disjunctions of atoms.
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Furthermore, if the head of a causal rule is a conjunction, or if its body is a disjunction,
then the rule can be broken into simpler rules:
Proposition 4. (i) Replacing a rule
F ∧G⇐H
in a causal theory by the rules
F ⇐H, G⇐H
does not change the set of models.
(ii) Replacing a rule
F ⇐G∨H
in a causal theory by the rules
F ⇐G, F ⇐H
does not change the set of models.
Taken together, these facts allow us to replace any rule in a causal theory by several
rules whose heads are disjunctions of atoms, and whose bodies are conjunctions of atoms.
2.5. Constraints
As we saw in Section 2.3, adding a rule to a causal theory may affect the theory
nonmonotonically—it can get new models. The proposition below shows that the effect
of adding constraints (rules with head ⊥) is monotonic.
We say that an interpretation I violates a constraint ⊥⇐ F if I satisfies F .
Proposition 5. Let T1 and T2 be causal theories of a signature σ , such that every rule in T2
is a constraint. An interpretation of σ is a model of T1 ∪ T2 iff it is a model of T1 and does
not violate any of the constraints T2.
In other words, the effect of adding a set of constraints to a causal theory is simply to
eliminate the models that violate at least one of these constraints.
For instance, the theory whose rules are (11) and (13) has two models: I1(c) = 1 and
I2(c)= 2. The constraint
⊥⇐ c= 2∨ c= 3 (14)
is violated by I2. Consequently, the theory with rules (11), (13) and (14) has one model, I1.
Corollary 1. A causal theory T entails a formula F iff the theory T ∪ {⊥ ⇐ F } is
inconsistent.
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2.6. Definite theoriesA causal theory T is definite if
• the head of every rule of T is an atom or ⊥, and
• no atom is the head of infinitely many rules of T .
For instance, causal theory (11) is definite. Causal theory (2) is, strictly speaking, not
definite, but it can be turned into a definite theory by replacing ¬q in the head of the last
rule with the equivalent atom:
p⇐ q,
q⇐ q, (15)
q = f⇐¬q.
The “completion” process described below reduces the problem of finding a model of a
definite causal theory to the problem of finding a model of a set of formulas.
Take a definite causal theory T of a signature σ . We say that an atom c= v of σ is trivial
if the domain of c is a singleton. For each nontrivial atom A, the completion formula for A
is the formula
A≡G1 ∨ · · · ∨Gn
where G1, . . . ,Gn (n  0) are the bodies of the rules of T with head A. The completion
of T is obtained by taking the completion formulas for all nontrivial atoms of σ , along
with the formula ¬F for each constraint ⊥⇐ F in T .
Proposition 6. The models of a definite causal theory are precisely the models of its
completion.
For instance, the completion of (11) is
c= 1≡ c= 1,
c= v ≡⊥ (v ∈Dom(c) \ {1}) (16)
if |Dom(c)|> 1. Otherwise the atom c = 1 is trivial, and the completion is empty. In both
cases, the only model of the completion is defined by I (c)= 1. As discussed in Section 2.3,
this is the only model of (11).
After adding rule (12), the completion turns into
c= 1≡ c= 1,
c= 2≡,
c= v ≡⊥ (v ∈Dom(c) \ {1,2}).
The only model of these formulas is defined by I (c)= 2.
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The completion of (15) is
p ≡ q,
p = f≡⊥,
q ≡ q,
q = f≡¬q.
(17)
The last two equivalences are identically true and can be dropped. The only model of the
first two equivalences is the interpretation I1 (mapping both p and q to t) that was found
in Section 2.3 to be the only model of (2).
Here are two more examples of the use of completion. First, we will show how to turn
any set X of formulas into a causal theory that has the same models as X. The rules of this
theory are
• A⇐A for every nontrivial atom A, and
• the constraints ⊥⇐¬F for every F ∈X.
The completion of this theory consists of the formulas A≡ A for nontrivial atoms A and
the formulas ¬¬F for all F ∈X. Clearly, the completion is equivalent to X.
Second, definite theories can be used to express the “closed-world assumption”, as
follows. Take a Boolean signature σ . The assumption that the elements of σ are false
by default can be expressed by the rules
¬c⇐¬c (c ∈ σ) (18)
(if c is false then there is a cause for this). If, for some subset S of σ , we combine (18) with
the rules
c⇐ (c ∈ S),
we will get a causal theory whose only model is the interpretation I that maps the constants
in S to t and all other constants to f. Indeed, the completion of this theory consists of the
formulas
c≡ (c ∈ S),
c≡⊥ (c ∈ σ \ S),
c= f≡¬c (c ∈ σ),
and I is the only model of these formulas.
The assertion of Proposition 6 would be incorrect if we did not restrict the completion
process to nontrivial atoms. Consider, for instance, the causal theory whose signature
consists of one constant c with the domain {0}, and whose set of rules is empty. If the
definition of completion were extended to trivial atoms then the completion of this theory
would be c= 0≡⊥, which is inconsistent.
Proposition 6 shows that the satisfiability problem for finite definite causal theories
belongs to class NP. It is clearly NP-complete.
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3. Actions and change3.1. A very simple example
Before presenting a formalization of the Monkey and Bananas domain in causal logic,
we consider a much simpler domain: a system whose state is determined by one truth-
valued parameter p. The only available action a changes the value of this parameter to t.
Assume first that we are only interested in histories of length 1, that is to say, in pairs
of successive states s0, s1. In the spirit of the examples from Section 2.2, the system under
consideration can be described by a causal theory using the Boolean constants 0 :p, 1 :p
and 0 : a. The effect of executing the action is described by the causal rule
1:p⇐ 0:a. (19)
Rule (19) by itself does not give an adequate description of the system, because it does
not tell us
(i) how to determine the value of p in the initial state s0,
(ii) how to determine whether action a is executed,
(iii) how to determine the value of p in the final state s1 if a is not executed.
The answer to (i) is that the initial state of the system is arbitrary. We will exempt 0 :p
from the principle of universal causation by rules similar to the last two rules of (2):
0:p⇐ 0:p,
0:¬p⇐ 0:¬p. (20)
Whichever causes determine the initial state of the system, they are outside the theory; 0:p
is “exogenous”. (According to the convention introduced at the end of Section 2.2, 0 :¬p
stands for ¬0:p.)
The answer to (ii) is similar: whichever causes determine whether or not the action is
executed, they are outside the theory; 0:a is exogenous as well:
0:a⇐ 0:a, (21)
0:¬a⇐ 0:¬a.
The answer to (iii) is that, when action a is not executed, the value of p in state s1
is determined by “commonsense inertia”—it is the same as in state s0. This idea can be
expressed by the rules
1:p⇐ (0:p)∧ (1:p), (22)
1:¬p⇐ (0:¬p)∧ (1:¬p).
The first rule says that if the value of p is t both in state s0 and in state s1 then there is a
cause for it to be t in state s1. Intuitively, inertia is the cause. (To put it differently, this rule
says that p is true by default in state s1 if it is true in state s0.) The second rule expresses
a similar condition on the value f. Rules (22) illustrate the solution to the frame problem
adopted throughout this paper.
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To find models of causal theory (19)–(22), we compute the completion of this theory
and translate it into classical propositional logic, as this is done for theory (2) in Section 2.6
and Appendix A. The result is
0:p≡ 0:p,
¬0:p≡¬0:p,
1:p≡ 0:a ∨ (0:p∧ 1:p),
¬1:p≡¬0:p ∧¬1:p,
0:a ≡ 0:a,
¬0:a ≡¬0:a.
The first two lines and the last two lines are tautologies. The third line can be rewritten as
the conjunction of two implications:
1:p⊃ 0:a ∨ 0:p,
0:a ⊃ 1:p.
The fourth line is equivalent to
0:p⊃ 1:p.
The conjunction of these three implications can be rewritten in the form of an explicit
definition of 1:p in terms of 0:a and 0:p:
1:p≡ 0:a ∨ 0:p.
(The end value of p is t iff action a is executed or the initial value of p is t.) This
calculation shows that causal theory (19)–(22) has 4 models, corresponding to the possible
combinations of the values of 0:p and 0:a.
To get a causal theory whose models correspond to the histories of the same simple
domain whose length is m (m 0), we introduce Boolean constants i :p for i = 0, . . . ,m
and i :a for i = 0, . . . ,m− 1. The value of i :p characterizes state si—it gives the value of
the parameter p in that state. The value of i :a characterizes the event occurring between
states si and si+1—it tells us whether that event included the execution of action a.
Rules (19)–(22) are generalized as follows:
i + 1:p⇐ i :a,
0:p⇐ 0:p,
0:¬p⇐ 0:¬p,
i :a⇐ i :a, (23)
i :¬a⇐ i :¬a,
i + 1:p⇐ (i :p)∧ (i + 1:p),
i + 1:¬p⇐ (i :¬p)∧ (i + 1:¬p)
(i = 0, . . . ,m − 1). Call this causal theory SDm (for “simple domain, histories of
length m”). For instance, SD0 consists of just two rules
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0:p⇐ 0:p,
(24)
0:¬p⇐ 0:¬p.
Theory SD0 has two models, corresponding to the possible states of the system.
Theory SD1 is identical to (19)–(22). For any m, the completion of SDm can be rewritten
as m equivalences
i + 1:p≡ (i :a)∨ (i :p) (0 i < m).
It follows that SDm has 2m+1 models, each characterized by the truth values assigned to
the constants 0:p and i :a (i = 0, . . . ,m− 1).
3.2. Monkey and Bananas
We will now describe a causal theory MBm (m 0) whose models represent all possible
histories of length m in the Monkey and Bananas domain. The signature of this theory is
listed in (5)–(8). Recall that it consists of symbols (3) and (4) prefixed by i : and symbols
of the forms
Walk(l), PushBox(l), ClimbOn, ClimbOff , GraspBananas (25)
prefixed by i : with i < m. Here and below, l ranges over {L1,L2,L3}, and i ranges over
{0, . . . ,m}.
As discussed in Section 2.1, the possible states of the Monkey and Bananas system
are described by the interpretations of constants (3), (4) that satisfy two conditions: if the
monkey has the bananas then the monkey and the bananas are at the same location; if
the monkey is on the box then the monkey and the box are at the same location. In the
causal theory MBm we postulate the following causal counterparts of these conditions. If
the monkey has the bananas then there is a cause for the bananas to be at the same place
where the monkey is:
i :Loc(Bananas)= l⇐ i :(HasBananas∧ Loc(Monkey)= l). (26)
If the monkey is on the box then there is a cause for the monkey to be at the same place
where the box is:
i :Loc(Monkey)= l⇐ i :(OnBox∧ Loc(Box)= l). (27)
We will see soon why including these rules is convenient.
The next group of rules describes the effects and preconditions of walking:
i + 1:Loc(Monkey)= l⇐ i :Walk(l),
⊥⇐ i :(Walk(l)∧ Loc(Monkey)= l), (28)
⊥⇐ i :(Walk(l)∧OnBox)
(i < m). We have seen the first of these rules in Section 2.2. The other two rules are similar
to constraints (10).
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The effect of walking on the location of the monkey is not the only possible effect of this
action: if the monkey has the bananas then walking will affect the location of the bananas
as well. This second effect of walking can be described by the rules
i + 1:Loc(Bananas)= l⇐ i :(HasBananas∧Walk(l)).
But we will not include these rules, because they would be redundant: in the presence
of (26) the change in the location of the bananas is an indirect effect, or “ramification”, of
walking (and of any other action that affects the location of the monkey). The possibility
of this simplification is what makes (26) an attractive postulate. Similarly, in the presence
of (27), a change in the location of the monkey is an indirect effect of any action that affects
the location of the box, if it is executed when the monkey is on the box. (Scenarios like
this are possible in the enhanced version of the Monkey and Bananas domain described in
Section 3.4.)
Pushing the box has two effects and three preconditions:
i + 1:Loc(Box)= l⇐ i :PushBox(l),
i + 1:Loc(Monkey)= l⇐ i :PushBox(l),
⊥⇐ i :(PushBox(l)∧ Loc(Monkey)= l), (29)
⊥⇐ i :(PushBox(l)∧OnBox),
⊥⇐ i :(PushBox(l)∧ Loc(Monkey) = Loc(Box))
(i < m). The descriptions of the other actions have a similar structure:
i + 1:OnBox⇐ i :ClimbOn,
⊥⇐ i :(ClimbOn∧OnBox),
⊥⇐ i :(ClimbOn∧ Loc(Monkey) = Loc(Box)),
i + 1:¬OnBox⇐ i :ClimbOff , (30)⊥⇐ i :(ClimbOff ∧¬OnBox),
i + 1:HasBananas⇐ i :GraspBananas,
⊥⇐ i :(GraspBananas∧HasBananas),
⊥⇐ i :(GraspBananas∧¬OnBox),
⊥⇐ i :(GraspBananas∧ Loc(Monkey) = Loc(Bananas))
(i < m). Some of these rules are familiar to us from Section 2.2.
The next group of rules expresses that some combinations of actions cannot be executed
concurrently:
⊥⇐ i :(Walk(l)∧ PushBox(l)),
⊥⇐ i :(Walk(l)∧ClimbOn), (31)⊥⇐ i :(PushBox(l)∧ClimbOn),
⊥⇐ i :(ClimbOff ∧GraspBananas)
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(i < m).4 To complete the list of postulates, we need to add• rules expressing that the initial state is exogenous, which are similar to (20),
• rules expressing that the execution of actions is exogenous, which are similar to (21),
and
• inertia rules, which are similar to (22).
To say that the initial state is exogenous, we postulate
0:c= v⇐ 0:c= v, (32)
where c is any of the symbols (3), (4), and v ∈ Dom(0 :c). To say that the execution of
actions is exogenous, we postulate
i :c= v⇐ i :c= v, (33)
where c is any of the symbols (25), i < m, and v ∈ {f, t}. The inertia rules are
i + 1:c= v⇐ (i :c= v)∧ (i + 1:c= v), (34)
where c is any of the symbols (3), (4); i < m; v ∈Dom(i :c).
We define MBm as the causal theory whose rules are (26)–(34). The models of this
theory correspond to the possible histories of the Monkey and Bananas domain of lengthm.
3.3. Reasoning and planning
Since causal theories MBm are definite, the process of completion described in
Section 2.6 can be used to reduce some computational problems related to the Monkey
and Bananas domain to the satisfiability problem for propositional logic. This idea is at
the heart of the operation of CCALC, which turns a given query into a set of propositional
formulas and then invokes a satisfiability solver to find an answer.
Consider a few examples.
Prediction. Initially, the monkey is at L1, the bananas are at L2, and the box is at L3. The
monkey walks to L3 and then pushes the box to L2. Does it follow that in the resulting
state the monkey, the bananas and the box are at the same location?
This question can be formalized as follows: Determine whether MB2 entails the formula
[(0:Loc(Monkey)= L1)∧ (0:Loc(Bananas)= L2)∧ (0:Loc(Box)= L3)
∧ (0:Walk(L3))∧ (1:PushBox(L2))]
⊃ 2:(Loc(Monkey)= Loc(Bananas)∧ Loc(Bananas)= Loc(Box)). (35)
4 Equivalently, we could prohibit the concurrent execution of all possible pairs of actions. For the pairs
of actions not included in (31), the fact that their concurrent execution is impossible follows from the other
postulates. For instance, actions Walk(l) and Walk(l1) for l = l1 cannot be executed at the same time because
their effects are incompatible. Actions Walk(l) and ClimbOff cannot be executed at the same time because their
preconditions are incompatible.
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This is equivalent to asking whether (35) is entailed by the completion of MB2, that is to
say, whether the set of formulas obtained by adding the negation of (35) to the completion
of MB2 is unsatisfiable. The answer to this question is yes.
Postdiction. The monkey walked to location L3 and then pushed the box. Does it follow
that the box was initially at L3?
This question can be formalized as follows: Determine whether MB2 entails the formula[(
0:Walk(L3)
)∧
(
1:
∨
l
PushBox(l)
)]
⊃ 0:Loc(Box)= L3. (36)
It can be reduced to the satisfiability problem in the same way as the prediction problem
above. The answer to this question is yes.
Planning. For the initial state described in the prediction problem above, find the shortest
sequence of actions that would allow the monkey to have the bananas.
This problem can be formalized as follows: Find a model of MBm that satisfies the initial
conditions
0:Loc(Monkey)= L1, 0:Loc(Bananas)= L2, 0:Loc(Box)= L3 (37)
and the goal
m:HasBananas (38)
where m is the smallest number for which such a model exists. To solve this problem,
we take consecutively m = 0,1, . . . and look for an interpretation satisfying both the
completion of MBm and formulas (37), (38). Such an interpretation will be first found
for m= 4. It assigns the value t to
0:Walk(L3), 1:PushBox(L2), 2:ClimbOn, 3:GraspBananas.
These constants represent the shortest solution to the Monkey and Bananas Problem.
3.4. Concurrent actions and multiple agents
Causal theories can be used to describe the concurrent execution of actions by several
agents. Consider, for instance, the enhancement of the Monkey and Bananas domain that
involves several monkeys. Each monkey can walk, push the box, climb on and off, and
grasp the bananas, except that two monkeys cannot both have the bananas simultaneously,
or be on top of the box simultaneously.
In the modification of MBm described below, α and β range over a fixed finite nonempty
set M of symbols—the names of the monkeys. The signature consists of the symbols
i :Loc(x), i :HasBananas(α), i :OnBox(α) (39)
where x ∈M ∪ {Bananas,Box}, and the symbols
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i :Walk(α, l), i :PushBox(α, l), (40)
i :ClimbOn(α), i :ClimbOff (α), i :GraspBananas(α)
for i < m. As before, the domain of i :Loc(x) is {L1,L2,L3}; the other constants are
Boolean.
The first group of rules consists of generalizations of (26) and (27)
i :Loc(Bananas)= l⇐ i :(HasBananas(α)∧ Loc(α)= l),
i :Loc(α)= l⇐ i :(OnBox(α)∧ Loc(Box)= l)
and the new constraints
⊥⇐ i :(HasBananas(α)∧HasBananas(β)), (41)
⊥⇐ i :(OnBox(α)∧OnBox(β)) (42)
(α = β). Next, we generalize rules (28)–(31):
i + 1:Loc(α)= l⇐ i :Walk(α, l),
⊥⇐ i :(Walk(α, l)∧ Loc(α)= l),
⊥⇐ i :(Walk(α, l)∧OnBox(α)),
i + 1:Loc(Box)= l⇐ i :PushBox(α, l),
i + 1:Loc(α)= l⇐ i :PushBox(α, l),
⊥⇐ i :(PushBox(α, l)∧ Loc(α)= l),
⊥⇐ i :(PushBox(α, l)∧OnBox(α)),
⊥⇐ i :(PushBox(α, l)∧ Loc(α) = Loc(Box)),
i + 1:OnBox(α)⇐ i :ClimbOn(α),
⊥⇐ i :(ClimbOn(α)∧OnBox(α)),
⊥⇐ i :(ClimbOn(α)∧ Loc(α) = Loc(Box)),
i + 1:¬OnBox(α)⇐ i :ClimbOff (α),
⊥⇐ i :(ClimbOff (α)∧¬OnBox(α)),
i + 1:HasBananas(α)⇐ i :GraspBananas(α),
⊥⇐ i :(GraspBananas(α)∧HasBananas(β)),
⊥⇐ i :(GraspBananas(α)∧¬OnBox(α)),
⊥⇐ i :(GraspBananas(α)∧ Loc(α) = Loc(Bananas)),
⊥⇐ i :(Walk(α, l)∧ PushBox(α, l)),
⊥⇐ i :(Walk(α, l)∧ClimbOn(α)),
⊥⇐ i :(PushBox(α, l)∧ClimbOn(α)),
⊥⇐ i :(ClimbOff (α)∧GraspBananas(α))
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(i < m). Finally, we include rules (32) and (34) for c of any of the forms
Loc(x), HasBananas(α), OnBox(α)
and rule (33) for c of any of the forms
Walk(α, l), PushBox(α, l), ClimbOn(α), ClimbOff (α), GraspBananas(α).
This causal theory MBMm entails, for instance, that two monkeys cannot climb the box
simultaneously:
¬ i :(ClimbOn(α)∧ClimbOn(β))
(i < m,α = β). To prove this fact, note that, by Proposition 2, MBMm entails each of the
formulas
(i :ClimbOn(α))⊃ (i + 1:OnBox(α)),
(i :ClimbOn(β))⊃ (i + 1:OnBox(β)),
¬((i + 1:OnBox(α))∧ (i + 1:OnBox(β))).
If M is a singleton then MBMm is essentially identical to MBm.
3.5. Making rules defeasible
Using auxiliary constants, we can make causal rules “defeasible”. Consider, for
instance, the constraint (42) in MBMm that prohibits more than one monkey on top of the
box at the same time. We can make this constraint defeasible by rewriting it as
⊥⇐ i :(OnBox(α)∧OnBox(β)∧¬Ab1(α,β)), (43)
where i :Ab1(α,β) are “abnormality constants”—new Boolean constants assumed to be
false by default:
i :¬Ab1(α,β)⇐ i :¬Ab1(α,β). (44)
(Rule (44) is similar to the formalization (18) of the closed-world assumption.) The causal
theory obtained from MBMm by replacing (42) with (43) and (44) entails the conjunctive
terms ¬Ab1(α,β) that were added to the body of (42). In this sense, including these
terms did not make (42) weaker. But the limitations expressed by the modified rule can
be retracted by adopting additional postulates. Imagine, for instance, that David is a baby
monkey, so small that there is enough room for him on top of the box even when another
monkey is there. We can express this additional information by adding the rules
i :Ab1(David, α)⇐, (45)
i :Ab1(α,David)⇐.
The extended theory entails i :¬Ab1(α,β) only when α,β =David.
As another example, consider the rules describing the effect of pushing the box:
i + 1:Loc(Box)= l⇐ i :PushBox(α, l), (46)
i + 1:Loc(α)= l⇐ i :PushBox(α, l).
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We can make them defeasible by rewriting them asi + 1:Loc(Box)= l⇐ i :(PushBox(α, l)∧¬Ab2(α)), (47)
i + 1:Loc(α)= l⇐ i :(PushBox(α, l)∧¬Ab2(α)),
where i :Ab2(α) for i < m are new Boolean constants, and adding the rules
i :¬Ab2(α)⇐ i :¬Ab2(α). (48)
The modification (47) of rules (46) will be convenient if we decide later to enhance the
description of the domain by allowing the action PushBox to be unsuccessful. Imagine that
one of the monkeys, Goliath, is so heavy that the other monkeys cannot move the box while
Goliath sits on it. We can retract this special case of (47) by postulating
i :Ab2(α)⇐ i :OnBox(Goliath). (49)
Adding this rule does not make the action PushBox(α, l) nonexecutable when Goliath is on
the box; it only retracts the assumption about the effect of pushing the box on the locations
of the box and the monkey in this special case. The box with Goliath on top will stay, by
inertia, where it was, and so will the monkey. This example shows how assumptions about
effects of actions can be qualified by adding more postulates.
What if Goliath is trying to climb the box while α is trying to push it? To express that α
does not succeed in this case either, we postulate
i :Ab2(α)⇐ i :ClimbOn(Goliath). (50)
In the next state, Goliath will be on top of the box, but the location of α and the location of
the box will not change.
4. Language C+
4.1. Action description languages
Let us return to the causal theories SDm describing a simple action domain in
Section 3.1. Models of these theories can be visualized as paths in a “transition system”—
the graph shown in Fig. 1. The two vertices of the graph represent states; in one state, the
value of the parameter p is f, in the other it is t. The edges represent transitions between
states; the action a is executed in two transitions, and is not executed in the other two.
Fig. 1. The transition system corresponding to the causal theories SDm.
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There is a simple 1–1 correspondence between the models of SDm and the paths of
length m in this transition system. For instance, the model I of SD2 defined by
I (0:p)= f, I (0:a)= f, I (1:p)= f, I (1:a)= t, I (2:p)= t (51)
corresponds to the path
〈p = f, a = f, p = f, a = t, p = t〉
(start at the vertex p = f, follow the loop labeled a = f, and then follow the edge labeled
a = t to the vertex p = t). The models of SD0 correspond to the vertices of the transition
system, and the models of SD1 correspond to its edges.
The sequence of causal theories MBm (Section 3.2) can be represented by a graph also.
The models of MB0 correspond to the vertices of that graph, and the models of MB1
correspond to its edges. More generally, the models of MBm correspond to the paths of
length m. The same is true for the generalization MBMm of this sequence, where M is a fixed
set of symbols (Section 3.4), and for the modifications of MBMm introduced in Section 3.5.
Action description languages are formal languages for describing transition systems.
We will introduce here an action description language, called C+, and define how to turn
any action description D in this language into an infinite sequence D0,D1, . . . of causal
theories. We will see there is an action description in C+, called SD, that corresponds to the
sequence SDm defined in Section 3.1, and that there is also an action description MB that
corresponds to the sequence MBm from Section 3.2. The generalizations and modifications
of this sequence introduced in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 can be represented in C+ as well.
We will show that for any action description D, the theories D0 and D1 characterize the
vertices and edges of a transition system such that there is a 1–1 correspondence between
the paths of length m in this system and the models of Dm.
The “higher-level” notation of C+ is more concise than the notation of causal theories.
This fact, along with the availability of a transition system semantics, makes C+ an
attractive formalism for describing actions.
4.2. From action descriptions to causal theories
Begin with a multi-valued signature (see Section 2.1) partitioned into fluent constants
and action constants. The fluent constants are assumed to be further partitioned into simple
and statically determined.
Intuitively, fluent constants denote “fluents”, or parameters characterizing a state.
Action constants denote parameters characterizing an event leading from one state to
another. For instance, in the action description SD introduced below, p is a simple fluent
constant, and a is an action constant. Note that action constants are not required to be
Boolean; one possible use of non-Boolean action constants is discussed in Section 5.6. The
need to distinguish between simple and statically determined fluent constants is discussed
in Section 4.4.
A fluent formula is a formula such that all constants occurring in it are fluent constants.
An action formula is a formula that contains at least one action constant and no fluent
constants.
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A static law is an expression of the formcaused F if G (52)
where F and G are fluent formulas. An action dynamic law is an expression of the
form (52) in which F is an action formula and G is a formula. A fluent dynamic law is
an expression of the form
caused F if G after H (53)
where F and G are fluent formulas and H is a formula, provided that F does not contain
statically determined constants. A causal law is a static law, or an action dynamic law, or
a fluent dynamic law.
Fluent dynamic laws (53) are the most important element of the language, because they
can be used for describing direct effects of actions. If c is a Boolean action constant, we
express that F is an effect of executing c by the fluent dynamic law
caused F if  after c,
which can be abbreviated as
c causes F.
Static laws can be used to talk about causal dependencies between fluents in the same state,
and action dynamic laws can express causal dependencies between concurrently executed
actions.
An action description is a set of causal laws.
The formula F in a causal law (52) or (53) is called the head. Note that statically
determined constants are allowed in the heads of static laws, but not in the heads of
dynamic laws. This explains the term “statically determined”.
For any action description D and any nonnegative integer m, the causal theory Dm is
defined as follows. The signature of Dm consists of the pairs i :c such that
• i ∈ {0, . . . ,m} and c is a fluent constant of D, or
• i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1} and c is an action constant of D.
The domain of i :c is the same as the domain of c. By i :F we denote the result of inserting
i : in front of every occurrence of every constant in a formula F , and similarly for a set of
formulas. The rules of Dm are:
i :F ⇐ i :G (54)
for every static law (52) in D and every i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, and for every action dynamic
law (52) in D and every i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1};
i + 1:F ⇐ (i + 1:G)∧ (i :H) (55)
for every fluent dynamic law (53) in D and every i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1};
0:c= v⇐ 0:c= v (56)
for every simple fluent constant c and every v ∈ Dom(c).
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Note that the definition of Dm treats simple fluent constants and statically determined
fluent constants in different ways: rules (56) are included only when c is simple.
In the example (57) below, the following abbreviations are used. If c is an action
constant, the expression
exogenous c
stands for the action dynamic laws
caused c= v if c= v
for all v ∈ Dom(c). If c is a simple fluent constant, the expression
inertial c
stands for the fluent dynamic laws
caused c= v if c= v after c= v
for all v ∈ Dom(c). These abbreviations for causal laws are part of a longer list given in
Appendix B.
By SD we denote the following action description:
a causes p,
exogenous a, (57)
inertial p.
The causal theory SDm generated from this action description as defined above is identical
to the causal theory (23) denoted by SDm in Section 3.1 (to be precise, it turns into that
theory after dropping the trivial conjunctive terms  in some formulas, and replacing the
atoms of the form c= f with ¬c). Indeed, the first line of (57) corresponds to the rules
i + 1:p⇐ i :a,
the second line to
i :a⇐ i :a,
i :¬a⇐ i :¬a,
and the third to
i + 1:p⇐ (i :p)∧ (i + 1:p),
i + 1:¬p⇐ (i :¬p)∧ (i + 1:¬p).
The remaining two lines of (23)
0:p⇐ 0:p,
0:¬p⇐ 0:¬p
come from (56).
72 E. Giunchiglia et al. / Artificial Intelligence 153 (2004) 49–104
Notation: x ranges over {Monkey,Bananas,Box}; l ranges over {L ,L ,L }.1 2 3
Simple fluent constants: Domains:
Loc(x) {L1,L2,L3}
HasBananas,OnBox Boolean
Action constants: Domains:
Walk(l), PushBox(l), ClimbOn, ClimbOff , GraspBananas Boolean
Causal laws:
caused Loc(Bananas)= l if HasBananas∧ Loc(Monkey)= l
caused Loc(Monkey)= l if OnBox∧ Loc(Box)= l
Walk(l) causes Loc(Monkey)= l
nonexecutable Walk(l) if Loc(Monkey)= l
nonexecutable Walk(l) if OnBox
PushBox(l) causes Loc(Box)= l
PushBox(l) causes Loc(Monkey)= l
nonexecutable PushBox(l) if Loc(Monkey)= l
nonexecutable PushBox(l) if OnBox
nonexecutable PushBox(l) if Loc(Monkey) = Loc(Box)
Fig. 2. Action description MB, Part 1.
4.3. Monkey and Bananas in C+
The action description MB is shown in Figs. 2 and 3. The first two causal laws in
this description, corresponding to rules (26) and (27), are examples of static laws (52).
According to Appendix B,
nonexecutable c if F
stands for the fluent dynamic law
caused ⊥ if  after c∧ F.
The sequence of causal theories corresponding to action description MB is identical to the
sequence MBm defined in Section 3.2.
Fig. 4 shows the modification of the signature of MB needed to include a set M of names
of monkeys and to make some of the causal rules defeasible, as in Section 3.5. Note that
the fluent constants Ab1(α,β) are classified here as statically determined; this is essential
because the corresponding causal theories do not contain the rules
0:Ab1(α,β)⇐ 0:Ab1(α,β)
that would have been included, as a special case of (56), if these constants were simple.
The symbols Ab2(α) are classified as action constants, and not as fluent constants; this is
essential because the signature of the corresponding causal theory contains the constants
i :Ab2(α) for i < m, but not for i =m. Like the other action constants, Ab2(α) describes
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ClimbOn causes OnBox
nonexecutable ClimbOn if OnBox
nonexecutable ClimbOn if Loc(Monkey) = Loc(Box)
ClimbOff causes ¬OnBox
nonexecutable ClimbOff if ¬OnBox
GraspBananas causes HasBananas
nonexecutable GraspBananas if HasBananas
nonexecutable GraspBananas if ¬OnBox
nonexecutable GraspBananas if Loc(Monkey) = Loc(Bananas)
nonexecutable Walk(l) ∧ PushBox(l)
nonexecutable Walk(l) ∧ClimbOn
nonexecutable PushBox(l)∧ ClimbOn
nonexecutable ClimbOff ∧GraspBananas
exogenous c for every action constant c
inertial c for every simple fluent constant c
Fig. 3. Action description MB, Part 2.
Notation: α, β range over M ; x ranges over M ∪ {Bananas,Box}; l ranges over
{L1,L2,L3}.
Simple fluent constants: Domains:
Loc(x) {L1,L2,L3}
HasBananas(α),OnBox(α) Boolean
Statically determined fluent constants: Domains:
Ab1(α,β) Boolean
Action constants: Domains:
Walk(α, l), PushBox(α, l), ClimbOn(α), ClimbOff (α),
GraspBananas(α), Ab2(α) Boolean
Fig. 4. The signature of the action description corresponding to the sequence of causal theories from Section 3.5.
an event leading from one state to another, rather than a state: its value tells us whether
the execution of the action PushBox(α, l) during that event is “abnormal”. In one way,
however, Ab2(α) is different from the other action constants in this example: we would not
include
exogenous Ab2(α)
in the set of postulates. This is because the corresponding causal theories do not contain
the rules
i :Ab2(α)⇐ i :Ab2(α).
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Using an abbreviation introduced in Appendix B, we can write the causal laws
corresponding to causal rules (41) as
constraint ¬(HasBananas(α)∧HasBananas(β))
(α = β). The pair of rules (43), (44) can be written as
constraint ¬(OnBox(α)∧OnBox(β)) unless Ab1(α,β)
(α = β). The pair (47), (48) becomes
PushBox(α, l) causes Loc(Box)= l unless Ab2(α),
PushBox(α, l) causes Loc(α)= l unless Ab2(α).
The “exception” rules (45), (49) and (50) turn into the static laws
caused Ab1(David, α),
caused Ab1(α,David)
and the action dynamic laws
caused Ab2(α) if OnBox(Goliath),
caused Ab2(α) if ClimbOn(Goliath).
4.4. From action descriptions to transition systems
Consider an action description D with a set σ fl of fluent constants and a set σ act of
action constants. We will define now the transition system represented by D, using the
first two members D0, D1 of the sequence of causal theories corresponding to D. In this
definition, we identify an interpretation I in the sense of Section 2.1 with the set of atoms
that are satisfied by this interpretation, that is to say, with the set of atoms of the form
c= I (c). This convention allows us to represent any interpretation of the signature of Dm
in the form
(0:s0)∪ (0:e0)∪ (1:s1)∪ (1:e1)∪ · · · ∪ (m:sm) (58)
where s0, . . . , sm are interpretations of σ fl, and e1, . . . , em−1 are interpretations of σ act. For
instance, for the interpretation I defined by (51),
I = {0:p= f, 0:a = f, 1:p= f, 1:a = t, 2:p= t}
= 0:{p= f} ∪ 0:{a = f} ∪ 1:{p= f} ∪ 1:{a = t} ∪ 2:{p= t}.
A state is an interpretation s of σ fl such that 0:s is a model of D0. States are the vertices
of the transition system represented by D. A transition is a triple 〈s, e, s′〉, where s and s′
are interpretations of σ fl and e is an interpretation of σ act, such that 0 : s ∪ 0 : e ∪ 1 : s′
is a model of D1. Transitions correspond to the edges of the transition system: for every
transition 〈s, e, s′〉, it contains an edge from s to s′ labeled e. These labels e will be called
events.
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For example, the vertices of the transition system in Fig. 1 are {p = f} and {p = t};
accordingly, 0:{p = f} and 0:{p = t} are the models of causal theory (24). The transitions
of that transition system are
〈{p = f}, {a = f}, {p= f}〉,
〈{p = f}, {a = t}, {p= t}〉,
〈{p = t}, {a = f}, {p= t}〉,
〈{p = t}, {a = t}, {p= t}〉;
accordingly, the interpretations
0:{p= f} ∪ 0:{a = f} ∪ 1:{p= f},
0:{p= f} ∪ 0:{a = t} ∪ 1:{p= t},
0:{p= t} ∪ 0:{a = f} ∪ 1:{p= t},
0:{p= t} ∪ 0:{a = t} ∪ 1:{p= t}
are the models of causal theory (19)–(22).
The definition of the transition system above implicitly relies on the following property
of transitions:
Proposition 7. For any transition 〈s, e, s′〉, s and s′ are states.
The validity of this proposition depends on the fact that in the definition of a fluent
dynamic law (Section 4.2) the head is not allowed to contain statically determined fluent
constants. Indeed, imagine that this limitation is lifted. Then we will be able to form an
action description D that consists of two causal laws: the static law
caused p if p
and the fluent dynamic law
caused ¬p if  after p
where p is a statically determined Boolean fluent constant. For this D, causal theory D0 is
0:p⇐ 0:p
and causal theory D1 is
0:p⇐ 0:p,
1:p⇐ 1:p,
1:¬p⇐ 0:p.
The last member {p = f} of the transition 〈{p = t},∅, {p= f}〉 is not a state.
This fact explains the need to distinguish between fluent constants of two kinds—
simple, that are allowed in the heads of dynamic laws of D, and statically determined,
for which causal rules (56) are not automatically included in Dm.
The correspondence between the models of Dm and paths in the transition system
represented by D can be described as follows:
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Proposition 8. For any m > 0, an interpretation (58) of the signature of Dm is a model
of Dm iff each triple 〈si , ei, si+1〉 (0 i < m) is a transition.
4.5. Causal logic as a subset of C+
In Section 4.2 we defined the semantics of C+ by showing how to turn any action
description into a sequence of causal theories. A reduction in the opposite direction is
possible also. Any causal theory T can be turned into an action description by treating
every constant of T as a statically determined fluent constant, and rewriting every causal
rule
F ⇐G
as the static law
caused F if G.
It is easy to see that the states of the transition system represented by this action description
are identical to the models of T .
We will agree to identify a causal theory with the corresponding action description. We
will treat any causal theory, in other words, as an action description without simple fluent
constants, without action constants, and without dynamic laws. This convention allows us
to specify causal theories using the abbreviations for static laws introduced in Appendix B.
For instance, (2) can be now written as
caused p if q, (59)
exogenous q,
and (11) can be written as
default c= 1.
4.6. Rigid constants
A fluent constant c in the signature of an action description D is rigid (relative to D)
if, for every transition 〈s, e, s′〉 in the transition system represented by D, s′(c) = s(c).
Intuitively, rigid constants represent the fluents whose values are not affected by any events.
Imagine, for instance, that the monkey in the Monkey and Bananas domain is unable to
push the box. This assumption can be expressed by adding the causal laws
nonexecutable PushBox(l)
to the action description MB shown in Figs. 2, 3. This modification makes the fluent
constant Loc(Box) rigid. The corresponding transition system consists of 3 disconnected
parts: s(Loc(Box)) is L1 for the states s in the first part, L2 in the second part, and L3 in
the third. No edges of the transition system lead from one part to another.
Other examples of action descriptions with rigid constants are given by the extensions
of MB that contain symbols for the size and the material of the box, or for the species and
gender of the monkey.
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According to Appendix B, the expressionrigid c
stands for the set of causal laws
constraint c= v after c= v,
that is to say,
caused ⊥ if ¬(c= v) after c= v
for all v ∈ Dom(c). It is clear that c is rigid relative to any action description containing
these laws.
One of the reasons why rigid constants are interesting is that, under some conditions,
their presence allows us to make the causal theories Dm more compact, which can be
computationally advantageous. Let R be a set of fluent constants that are rigid relative
to D. Denote by DRm the causal theory whose constants and causal rules are obtained from
the constants and causal rules of Dm by dropping the time stamps before each constant
from R. For any interpretation I of the signature of Dm, by IR we denote the interpretation
of the signature of DRm defined by the formulas
IR(c)= I (0:c) if c ∈ R,
IR(i :c)= I (i :c) if c /∈ R.
Proposition 9. If
(i) every constant in R is statically determined, and
(ii) for every causal law in D that contains a constant from R in the head, all constants
occurring in this law belong to R,
then the mapping I → IR is a 1–1 correspondence between the models of Dm and the
models of DRm .
Thus dropping the time stamps in front of the rigid constants from R does not affect the
meaning of Dm if, first, R contains no simple constants, and second, no constant from R
“causally depends” on a constant that does not belong to R.
The following example shows that the assertion of Proposition 9 would be incorrect
without the first condition. Take D to be
rigid p,
default p
where p is a Boolean simple fluent, and let R = {p}. Then D1 is
⊥⇐ (1:p)∧¬(0:p),
⊥⇐¬(1:p)∧ (0:p),
0:p⇐ 0:p,
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1:p⇐ 1:p,
0:¬p⇐ 0:¬p
and DR1 is
⊥⇐ p ∧¬p,
⊥⇐¬p ∧ p,
p⇐ p,
¬p⇐¬p.
The interpretation {p= f} is a model of DR1 , but it does not have the form IR for any model
I of D1.
The following example shows that the assertion of Proposition 9 would be incorrect
without the second condition. Take D to be (59), where p and q are statically determined
fluent constants, and let R = {p}. Then D1 is
0:p⇐ 0:q,
1:p⇐ 1:q,
0:q⇐ 0:q,
1:q⇐ 1:q,
¬0:q⇐¬0:q,
¬1:q⇐¬1:q
and DR1 is
p⇐ 0:q,
p⇐ 1:q,
0:q⇐ 0:q,
1:q⇐ 1:q,
¬0:q⇐¬0:q,
¬1:q⇐¬1:q.
The interpretation {p = t,0:q = f,1:q = t} is a model of DR1 , but it does not have the form
IR for any model I of D1.
5. Expressive possibilities of the definite fragment of C+
An action description D is definite if
• the head of every causal law of D is an atom or ⊥, and
• no atom is the head of infinitely many causal laws of D.
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This is similar to the definition of a definite causal theory in Section 2.6. For any definite
action description D, the corresponding causal theories Dm are definite also, so that
many questions about transition systems described in the definite fragment of C+ can be
answered using the computational methods discussed in Sections 2.6 and 3.3.
The examples of action descriptions discussed in Section 4 are definite (or can be made
definite by replacing formulas ¬c in the heads of causal laws by atoms c = f). In this
section we give a few other examples illustrating the expressive possibilities of the definite
fragment of C+.
5.1. Actions with conditional effects
Effects of an action can be “conditional”: they may be caused by executing the action
in some states, but not in others. As an example of representing conditional effects in C+,
we formalize in Fig. 5 an enhancement of the well-known “Yale shooting” example [14]
in which the effect of shooting depends on how the gun is aimed. As defined in Appendix
B, the expression
Shoot causes ¬Alive(x) if Target = x
in this action description stands for the fluent dynamic law
caused ¬Alive(x) if  after Shoot∧ Target = x.
Notation: x ranges over {Turkey1,Turkey2}.
Simple fluent constants: Domains:
Loaded, Alive(x) Boolean
Target {Turkey1,Turkey2,None}
Action constants: Domains:
Load, Aim(x), Shoot Boolean
Causal laws:
Load causes Loaded
Load causes Target = None
Aim(x) causes Target = x
Shoot causes ¬Alive(x) if Target = x
Shoot causes ¬Loaded
nonexecutable Shoot if ¬Loaded
nonexecutable Aim(x)∧ Shoot
exogenous c for every action constant c
inertial c for every simple fluent constant c
Fig. 5. Shooting turkeys.
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Notation: x ranges over {Jack,Car}; l ranges over {Home,Work}.Simple fluent constants: Domains:
Loc(x) {Home,Work}
Action constants: Domains:
Go(l) Boolean
Causal laws:
Go(l) causes Loc(Jack)= l
Go(l) may cause Loc(Car)= l if Loc(Car)= Loc(Jack)
nonexecutable Go(l) if Loc(Jack)= l
exogenous c for every action constant c
inertial c for every simple fluent constant c
Fig. 6. Going to work.
5.2. Nondeterministic actions
When Jack goes to work, he either walks there or drives his car. We view walking
and driving as two ways of executing the same action. The effect of that action on Jack’s
location is deterministic, but its effect on the location of his car is not.
The representation of this example in Fig. 6 describes the nondeterministic effect of
Go(l) by the expression
Go(l) may cause Loc(Car)= l if Loc(Car)= Loc(Jack).
According to Appendix B, it stands for the fluent dynamic law
caused Loc(Car)= l if Loc(Car)= l
after Go(l)∧ Loc(Car)= Loc(Jack).
By placing a copy of the head Loc(Car) = l after if we say that this is not a necessary
effect of the action, but merely a possible one. If this condition holds in the resulting state
then there is a cause for this.
In the transition system represented by this action description we can find two different
edges that start at the same state and are labeled by the same event. For instance, there are
two edges that start at
{Loc(Jack)=Home,Loc(Car)=Home}
and have the label
{Go(Home)= f,Go(Work)= t}.
One of them leads to
{Loc(Jack)=Work,Loc(Car)=Home}
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Notation: x ranges over {LeftEnd,RightEnd}.Simple fluent constants: Domains:
Level(x) {Low,High}
OnTable Boolean
Action constants: Domains:
Lift(x) Boolean
Causal laws:
Lift(x) causes Level(x)= High
nonexecutable Lift(x) if Level(x)= High
caused ¬OnTable if Level(LeftEnd) = Level(RightEnd)
exogenous c for every action constant c
inertial c for every simple fluent constant c
Fig. 7. Lifting the ends of the table.
(walking), and the other to
{Loc(Jack)=Work,Loc(Car)=Work}
(driving).
5.3. Interaction between concurrently executed actions
In a standard example of interacting actions, two agents lift the opposite ends of a table
upon which various objects have been placed [33, Section 3]. If one end of the table has
been raised, the objects on the table will fall off. But if both ends are lifted simultaneously,
the objects on the table will remain fixed.
A formalization of this domain in C+ is shown in Fig. 7. The change in the value of the
fluent OnTable is treated here as an indirect effect of changes in the positions of the ends
of the table.
5.4. Noninertial fluents
Consider a pendulum that moves from its leftmost position to the rightmost and back,
with each swing taking one unit of time. We would like to describe the effect of holding
the pendulum steady in its current position for the duration of one unit of time.
The action description in Fig. 8 describes the “default” behavior of the pendulum by the
expressions
default Right after ¬Right
default ¬Right after Right
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Simple fluent constant: Domain:
Right Boolean
Action constant: Domain:
Hold Boolean
Causal laws:
Hold causes Right if Right
Hold causes ¬Right if ¬Right
default Right after ¬Right
default ¬Right after Right
exogenous Hold
Fig. 8. Holding the pendulum.
that stand for the dynamic laws
caused Right if Right after ¬Right,
caused ¬Right if ¬Right after Right
(Appendix B). They are used here instead of the dynamic laws
inertial Right,
that is to say, instead of
caused Right if Right after Right,
caused ¬Right if ¬Right after ¬Right.
This is an example of a simple fluent constant that is not postulated to be inertial.
5.5. Defined fluents
In the process of designing an action description, we may want to introduce a fluent
constant that is defined in terms of other fluent constants. To see how this can be done,
imagine that we want to expand action description MB (Figs. 2, 3) by the new Boolean
fluent constant NextToBox that can serve as shorthand for the formula Loc(Monkey) =
Loc(Box).
In the extended action description MB′ we make the new fluent constant NextToBox
statically determined, and include two static laws containing that constant in the head:
caused NextToBox if Loc(Monkey)= Loc(Box), (60)
default ¬NextToBox
(there is a cause for NextToBox to be true if the monkey and the box are at the same location;
otherwise, NextToBox is false).
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It is easy to see that the completion of MB′m can be obtained from the completion of
MBm by adding the formulas
i : (NextToBox≡ Loc(Monkey)= Loc(Box))
(i = 0, . . . ,m). This observation shows that the transition system represented by MB is
isomorphic to the transition system represented by MB′: every state of the former can be
turned into the corresponding state of the latter by assigning to NextToBox the truth value
equal to the truth value of the formula Loc(Monkey)= Loc(Box).
In the presence of (60), any occurrences of Loc(Monkey)= Loc(Box) in the bodies of
the causal laws of MB can be equivalently replaced with NextToBox. For instance,
nonexecutable PushBox(l) if Loc(Monkey) = Loc(Box)
can be rewritten as
nonexecutable PushBox(l) if ¬NextToBox.
Proposition 4(ii) shows that the first of the causal laws (60) can be equivalently replaced
with
caused NextToBox if Loc(Monkey)= l ∧ Loc(Box)= l
(l = L1,L2,L3).
The fact that the transition systems represented by MB and MB′ are isomorphic to each
other depends on the assumption that the new fluent constant is statically determined. If we
made NextToBox a simple fluent constant then the causal theories MB′ would have been
different because of the instance
0:NextToBox⇐ 0:NextToBox
of (56).
5.6. Describing actions by attributes
Executing the action Publish causes the Boolean fluent HasPublications to become true:
Publish causes HasPublications. (61)
Imagine that we want to enhance an action description containing this causal law
by distinguishing between publications of different kinds. The fluent HasPublications
becomes true no matter whether a conference paper or a journal article has been published,
but in the second case the action has one more effect—the fluent HasJournalPublications
becomes true also. This distinction can be expressed by switching from the notation
Publish for the action in question to the more elaborate notation Publish(k), where k ranges
over the types of publications Conference, Journal. In the modified action description, (61)
turns into
Publish(k) causes HasPublications (62)
for both possible values of k, and additionally we postulate
Publish(Journal) causes HasJournalPublications. (63)
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If we later decide to distinguish between publications in terms of their length, the
notation for the action will need to be amended again. Instead of Publish(k), we can denote
the action, for instance, by Publish(k, l), where the number of pages l ranges over an initial
segment of positive integers. Causal laws (62) and (63) will turn then into
Publish(k, l) causes HasPublications,
(64)
Publish(Journal, l) causes HasJournalPublications,
and we also will be able to say
Publish(k, l) causes HasLongPublications (l > 30)
to express that publishing a paper that is over 30 pages causes the fluent HasLongPublica-
tions to become true.
This example illustrates the need to modify notation for actions by introducing
additional arguments, and to change the form of causal laws, that often arises when we
want to introduce additional distinctions. An alternative way to represent such distinctions,
which is sometimes preferable, is based on expressing them by “attributes”. In Fig. 9, the
kind and length of a publication are treated as attributes of the action Publish. The attributes
Kind and Length are action constants—their values, like the value of Publish, characterize
an event occurring between two states. The domain of every attribute of an action includes
Notation: l ranges over {1, . . . ,100}.
Simple fluent constants: Domains:
HasPublications, HasJournalPublications,
HasLongPublications Boolean
Action constants: Domains:
Publish Boolean
Kind {Conference, Journal,None}
Length {1, . . . ,100,None}
Causal laws:
constraint HasJournalPublications ⊃ HasPublications
constraint HasLongPublications ⊃ HasPublications
Publish causes HasPublications
always Kind = None ≡¬Publish
Publish causes HasJournalPublications if Kind = Journal
always Length = None ≡¬Publish
Publish causes HasLongPublications if Length = l for l > 30
exogenous c for every action constant c
inertial c for every simple fluent constant c
Fig. 9. Publishing papers.
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the special value None, and the attribute is required to take that value (to be “undefined”)
if and only if the action is not executed. For instance, we postulate
always Kind = None≡¬Publish.
According to Appendix B, this expression stands for the fluent dynamic law
caused ⊥ if  after ¬(Kind = None≡¬Publish).
6. Action descriptions and queries in the language of the Causal Calculator
The original version of the Causal Calculator was written by one of the authors as part
of his dissertation [25]. Now the system is being maintained by Texas Action Group at
Austin.5 It can be downloaded from its home page http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/
ccalc/.
To illustrate the syntax of the input language of CCALC, we show in Figs. 10 and 11
how to rewrite in that language the C+ description of the Monkey and Bananas domain
given in Figs. 2 and 3.
CCALC is written in Prolog, and it follows the Prolog tradition of capitalizing variables.
This is why, in the language of CCALC, Loc(Monkey)= l turns into loc(monkey)=L.
The ranges of variables, described at the beginning of Fig. 2, are given names in the
sort declarations at the beginning of Fig. 10. The extent of each sort is defined in object
declarations.
The constant declaration
loc(thing) :: inertialFluent(location)
has the same meaning as the declaration
loc(thing) :: simpleFluent(location)
accompanied by the fluent dynamic law
inertial loc(X)
where X is a variable for things. That is to say, this declaration says that any expression
consisting of the symbol loc followed by a thing in parentheses is a simple fluent
constant, that the domain of each of these constants is the set of locations, and that
these constants are postulated to be inertial. The symbol inertialFluent is used more
often than simpleFluent in CCALC action descriptions, because the inertia assumption
is required for almost every simple fluent constant. (There are exceptions, however, as we
saw in Section 5.4.) When the symbol inertialFluent in the declaration of a constant
is not followed by a sort, the constant is assumed to be Boolean. This convention is used
5 http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag.
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thing;
location.
:- objects
monkey,bananas,box :: thing;
l1,l2,l3 :: location.
:- variables
L :: location.
:- constants
loc(thing) :: inertialFluent(location);
hasBananas,onBox :: inertialFluent;
walk(location),
pushBox(location),
climbOn,
climbOff,
graspBananas :: exogenousAction.
caused loc(bananas)=L if hasBananas & loc(monkey)=L.
caused loc(monkey)=L if onBox & loc(box)=L.
walk(L) causes loc(monkey)=L.
nonexecutable walk(L) if loc(monkey)=L.
nonexecutable walk(L) if onBox.
pushBox(L) causes loc(box)=L.
pushBox(L) causes loc(monkey)=L.
nonexecutable pushBox(L) if loc(monkey)=L.
nonexecutable pushBox(L) if onBox.
nonexecutable pushBox(L) if loc(monkey)\=loc(box).
Fig. 10. Monkey and Bananas in the language of CCALC, Part 1.
in the declarations of onBox and hasBananas. Similarly, the action constants declared
in Fig. 10 are understood to be Boolean, since no other domain is specified.
The declaration
walk(location) :: exogenousAction
has the same meaning as the declaration
walk(location) :: action
accompanied by the action dynamic law
exogenous walk(L)
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climbOn causes onBox.
nonexecutable climbOn if onBox.
nonexecutable climbOn if loc(monkey)\=loc(box).
climbOff causes -onBox.
nonexecutable climbOff if -onBox.
graspBananas causes hasBananas.
nonexecutable graspBananas if hasBananas.
nonexecutable graspBananas if -onBox.
nonexecutable graspBananas if loc(monkey)\=loc(bananas).
nonexecutable walk(L) & pushBox(L).
nonexecutable walk(L) & climbOn.
nonexecutable pushBox(L) & climbOn.
nonexecutable climbOff & graspBananas.
Fig. 11. Monkey and Bananas in the language of CCALC, Part 2.
:- query
maxstep :: 1..10;
0: loc(monkey)=l1,
loc(bananas)=l2,
loc(box)=l3;
maxstep: hasBananas.
Fig. 12. A planning problem in the language of CCALC.
where L is a variable for locations. That is to say, this declaration says that any
expression consisting of the symbol walk followed by a location in parentheses is
a Boolean-valued action constant, and that these constants are postulated to be exogenous.
The symbol exogenousAction is used more often than action in CCALC action
descriptions, because most actions are exogenous. (There are exceptions, however, such as
Ab2(α) in Section 4.3.)
The rest of the CCALC encoding of the Monkey and Bananas domain consists of causal
laws. It is almost identical to the list of causal laws in Figs. 2, 3.
Fig. 12 shows how a planning problem can be represented in the language of the Causal
Calculator. This piece of code instructs CCALC to test successively m= 1, . . . ,10 and find
the smallest value for which MBm has a model satisfying both the initial conditions (37)
and the goal (38). In response to this query, CCALC produces the following output:
0: loc(monkey)=l1 loc(bananas)=l2 loc(box)=l3
ACTIONS: walk(l3)
1: loc(monkey)=l3 loc(bananas)=l2 loc(box)=l3
ACTIONS: pushBox(l2)
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ACTIONS: climbOn
3: onBox loc(monkey)=l2 loc(bananas)=l2 loc(box)=l2
ACTIONS: graspBananas
4: hasBananas onBox loc(monkey)=l2 loc(bananas)=l2
loc(box)=l2
7. Related work
7.1. Default logic
A causal theory of a Boolean signature can be viewed as a default theory in the
sense of [36]. (The syntax and semantics of propositional default theories are reviewed
in Section 8.10.) Let us agree to identify a causal rule F ⇐G with the default
: G
F
. (65)
In the statement of the following proposition, we identify an interpretation I with the set
of formulas satisfied by I .
Proposition 10. Let T be a causal theory of a Boolean signature. An interpretation I is a
model of T iff I is an extension for T in the sense of default logic.
This theorem shows that causal rules are essentially propositional defaults without
prerequisites and with a single justification, as long as we are only interested in the
extensions that correspond to interpretations (that is to say, in the extensions that are
consistent and complete).
For instance, causal theory (2) corresponds to the default theory
: q
p
,
: q
q
,
: ¬q
¬q .
This theory has two extensions: the set of all consequences of p,q and the set of all
consequences of ¬q . The first extension is complete, and it corresponds to the only model
of (2).
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This translation into default logic can be applied, in particular, to causal theories of the
form Dm (Section 4). Given an action description D whose signature is Boolean, and a
nonnegative integer m, consider the following set of defaults:6
: (i :G)
i :F
for every static law (52) in D and every i ∈ {0, . . . ,m}, and for every action dynamic
law (52) in D and every i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1};
: (i + 1:G)∧ (i :H)
i + 1:F (66)
for every fluent dynamic law (53) in D and every i ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1};
: (0:c= v)
0:c= v
for every simple fluent constant c and every v ∈ Dom(c). According to Proposition 10, an
interpretation I is a model of Dm if and only if it is an extension for this set of defaults.
Alternatively, the second conjunctive term in the justification of (66) can be turned into a
prerequisite, so that this default becomes
(i :H) : (i + 1:G)
i + 1:F .
As it turns out, if the translation of the fluent dynamic laws of D is modified in this
way, the complete, consistent extensions for the default theory remain the same. (Proof
is straightforward using the Splitting Sequence Theorem for default logic from [42].)
It is interesting to apply the modified translation to the dynamic laws inertial c
(Section 4). For Boolean c, this expression stands for the pair of dynamic laws
caused c if c after c,
caused ¬c if ¬c after ¬c.
In application to these laws, the modified translation gives the normal defaults
(i :c) : (i + 1:c)
i + 1:c ,
(i :¬c) : (i + 1:¬c)
i + 1:¬c .
This observation shows that the approach to the frame problem adopted in this paper is
closely related to the “frame default” from [36, Section 1.1.4].
7.2. Logic programming
The embedding of causal logic into default logic (Section 7.1) assumes that the
underlying signature is Boolean. If we assume, in addition, that the head of every rule
is an atom (c= t or c= f), then a causal theory can be also translated into the language of
6 Note that in these defaults the colon is used in two ways: to separate justifications from prerequisites, as in
default logic, and to separate time stamps from formulas, as described in Section 2.2.
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logic programs under the answer set semantics [11]. Using the equivalent transformations
discussed in Section 2.4, such a theory can be rewritten as a set of rules of the form
l0 ⇐ l1 ∧ · · · ∧ ln (67)
where l0, . . . , ln (n 0) are literals (c or ¬c). Let us agree to identify causal rule (67) with
the logic programming rule
l0 ← not l1, . . . ,not ln (68)
(l stands for the literal complementary to l). In the statement of the following proposition,
we identify an interpretation I with the set of literals satisfied by I .
Proposition 11. Let T be a causal theory whose rules have the form (67). An
interpretation I is a model of T iff I is an answer set for T in the sense of logic pro-
gramming.
This theorem shows that causal rules of the form (67) can be viewed as nondisjunctive
rules under the answer set semantics, as long as we are only interested in consistent and
complete answer sets.
Recall that an expression in the body of a rule in a logic program corresponds to a
justification in a default if that expression contains negation as failure, and it corresponds
to a conjunctive term of the prerequisite if it does not [11, Section 5]. From this perspective,
rule (68) is similar to default (65): the body of (68) does not include expressions without
negation as failure, and (65) does not have a prerequisite. On the other hand, the body
of (68) may have several occurrences of negation as failure, but (65) has only one
justification.
The completion process defined in Section 2.6 is a modification of the syntactic
transformation proposed in [4] as a semantics of negation as failure. For a Boolean
signature, this process differs from the propositional case of Clark’s completion in that
it introduces completion formulas not only for atoms in the sense of classical propositional
logic, but also for negative literals (atoms of the form c = f). This is why the completion
of causal theories was called “literal completion” when it was first described in [24].
This observation shows that it is easy to reduce the propositional case of Clark’s
completion to completion in the sense of causal logic. Let T be a finite set of rules of
the form
a⇐ l1 ∧ · · · ∧ ln
where a is an atom in the sense of classical propositional logic, and l1, . . . , ln (n 0) are
literals. Clark’s completion of T can be obtained by applying the completion procedure
defined in Section 2.6 to the union of T with the set of rules
¬a⇐¬a
for all atoms a. Indeed, in the presence of these additional rules, the completion formulas
for the negative literals are tautologies ¬a ≡¬a.
As a semantics of logic programming, completion is known to lead sometimes to
unintuitive results. For instance, under the completion semantics, the rules
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q(x, x)⇐ (69)
q(x, y)⇐ p(x, z)∧ q(z, y)
fail to express that q is the reflexive transitive closure of p.7 For this reason, the analogy
between causal theories and logic programs can be misleading. For instance, the union
of (69) with the closed-world assumption
¬q(x, y)⇐¬q(x, y)
fails to express in causal logic that q is the reflexive transitive closure of p.
7.3. Action languages
Language C+ is a new addition to the family of formal languages for describing
actions, which started with STRIPS [9] and ADL [35]. Gelfond and Lifschitz [12]
related language A (which is essentially the propositional fragment of ADL) to logic
programming. Baral and Gelfond [2] extended this work to a language that permits the
concurrent execution of actions (including the “difficult” cases, such as the example
discussed in Section 5.3).
A similar result for a language with static causal laws is proved in [43]. That work,
along with the theory of nonmonotonic causal reasoning presented in [24], has led to the
design of language C [13], which is the immediate predecessor of C+.
7.4. Other research on representing actions
The formalism discussed in this paper is part of a long line of research on representing
actions, and, in particular, of research on the frame problem in the presence of actions with
indirect effects. A critical discussion of this work and a comprehensive bibliography can
be found in [40].
The explicit definition of 1 :p in terms of 0 :p and 0 :a in Section 3.1 is similar to
successor state axioms introduced by Reiter [37] as a generalization of earlier work by
Pednault [34].
Among the research on the nonmonotonic logic of causation, besides the papers
mentioned in the introduction, Fangzhen Lin’s proposal to circumscribe the predicate
Caused is particularly relevant [21,22]. Although that approach uses a different model
of nonmonotonic reasoning, our formalism is similar to it in the sense that both theories
talk about “being caused”, but not about what a cause is. It is also interesting to note that
the circumscriptions used by Lin can be often reduced to a form of completion, just like
definite causal theories (Section 2.6).
An alternative way to apply causation to describing indirect effects of actions is
proposed in [41].
Nonmonotonic causal theories are similar in some ways to temporal action logics [7,
17], which were inspired by the ideas of [39]. The Causal Calculator can be compared
7 Example: combine (69) with rules p(1,1)⇐ and p(2,2)⇐, and let x, y, z range over {1,2}. Clark’s
completion of this program has an unintended model in which q is identically true.
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to VITAL (“Visualization and Implementation of Temporal Action Logics”)8—a powerful
software system for planning and for query answering in action domains.
The use of action attributes (Section 5.6) is an old idea in linguistic representations,
originally due to Davidson [5].
7.5. Satisfiability planning and answer set programming
Computationally, the operation of CCALC as a planner is a form of satisfiability
planning [15]. Since causal theories are closely related to logic programs, it can be also
viewed as a form of answer set programming [23,32] applied to plan generation [6,20].
Since CCALC employs satisfiability solvers for search, its operation is particularly close to
the operation of the answer set solver CMODELS.9
8. Proofs of theorems
8.1. Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1. An interpretation I is a model of a causal theory T if and only if, for every
formula F ,
I |= F iff T I |= F.
Proof.
I is a model of T iff I is the unique model of T I
iff for every atom c= v, I |= c= v iff T I |= c= v
iff for every formula F , I |= F iff T I |= F . ✷
8.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2. If a causal theory T contains a causal rule F ⇐G then T entails G⊃ F .
Proof. Let I be a model of T . If I |=G then F ∈ T I , and consequently I |= F . ✷
8.3. Proof of Proposition 3
Our proof of P2 -hardness is based on an embedding of disjunctive logic programs
(without classical negation) into causal theories, and on the investigation of the complexity
of disjunctive logic programs in [8]. We will describe the reduction first.
Consider a Boolean signature σ . A disjunctive logic program over σ is a set of (dlp)
rules of the form
a1; · · · ;ak ← b1, . . . , bm,not c1, . . . ,not cn (70)
8 http://www.ida.liu.se/∼jonkv/vital/.
9 http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/tag/cmodels/.
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where a1, . . . , ak, b1, . . . , bm, c1, . . . , cn ∈ σ , k  1, m,n 0. Let us identify each dlp
rule (70) with the causal rule
b1 ∧ · · · ∧ bm ⊃ a1 ∨ · · · ∨ ak ⇐¬c1 ∧ · · · ∧ ¬cn . (71)
Let P be a disjunctive logic program over σ . If we agree to identify an interpretation I
of σ with the set {c ∈ σ : I (c)= t}, then we can say that I is an answer set for P if I is
a minimal model of PI . Although this is an unusual way of stating the definition of an
answer set, its equivalence to the standard definition from [11] (in the absence of classical
negation) is easily verified.
Lemma. Let P be a disjunctive logic program over σ . An interpretation I of σ is an
answer set for P iff I is a model of the causal theory
P ∪ {¬c⇐¬c: c ∈ σ } .
This lemma too is easily verified. It is similar to an embedding of disjunctive programs
into default logic due to Sakama and Inoue [38].
Proposition 3. The problem of determining that a finite causal theory is consistent is P2 -
complete.
Proof. We first establish P2 membership. Let T be a causal theory. If we know that
I |= T I , then it is an NP problem to determine that I is not a model of T : simply guess
an interpretation J , and verify (in polynomial time) that J = I and J |= T I . Hence deter-
mining that T is consistent belongs to P2 : guess an interpretation I , verify (in polynomial
time) that I |= T I , and then use an NP-oracle to determine that I is a model of T .
P2 -hardness (for causal theories with Boolean signatures) follows from the lemma
above, since the problem of existence of an answer set for a finite disjunctive logic program
is P2 -hard [8, Corollary 3.8]. ✷
8.4. Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4. (i) Replacing a rule
F ∧G⇐H (72)
in a causal theory by the rules
F ⇐H, G⇐H (73)
does not change its models.
(ii) Replacing a rule
F ⇐G∨H (74)
in a causal theory by the rules
F ⇐G, F ⇐H (75)
does not change its models.
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Proof. Let causal theory Tr be obtained from a causal theory T by replacing a rule of
form (72) with the rules (73). Take any interpretation I , and consider two cases.
Case 1: I |=H . Then rule (72) guarantees that F ∧G ∈ T I , while rules (73) guarantee
that F,G ∈ T Ir . Otherwise T I and T Ir are identical. Hence I is the unique model of T I iff
I is the unique model of T Ir .
Case 2: I |=H . Then T I = T Ir .
In both cases, I is a model of T iff I is a model of Tr .
Now let Tr be obtained from a causal theory T by replacing a rule of form (74) with the
rules (75). For any interpretation I , T I = T Ir , and so T and Tr have the same models. ✷
8.5. Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5. Let T1 and T2 be causal theories of a signature σ , such that every rule
in T2 is a constraint. An interpretation of σ is a model of T1 ∪ T2 iff it is a model of T1 and
does not violate any of the constraints T2.
Proof. Let I be an interpretation of σ . Consider two cases.
Case 1: I violates a constraint of T2. Then T I2 = {⊥} and so
I |= T I1 ∪ T I2 = (T1 ∪ T2)I .
Hence I is not a model of T1 ∪ T2, which proves the claim in this case.
Case 2: I violates no constraint of T2. Then T I2 = ∅, so
T I1 = T I1 ∪ T I2 = (T1 ∪ T2)I .
Consequently T1 ∪ T2 and T1 have the same models, which proves the claim in this
case. ✷
8.6. Proof of Proposition 6
Proposition 6. The models of a definite causal theory are precisely the models of its
completion.
Proof. Let T be a definite causal theory. Assume that I is a model of T . It follows that
I violates no constraint of T , and thus satisfies every formula in the completion of T that
is obtained from a constraint. It remains to show that I satisfies the completion formula for
every nontrivial atom A. Consider two cases.
Case 1: A ∈ T I . Since T is definite and I |= T I , T I is a set of atoms true in I . So I
satisfies A, which is the left-hand side of the completion formula for A. Since A ∈ T I ,
there is a rule with head A whose body is true in I . Hence I also satisfies the right-hand
side of the completion formula for A.
Case 2: A /∈ T I . So there is no rule in T with head A whose body is true in I , which
shows that I doesn’t satisfy the right-hand side of the completion formula for A. It remains
to show that I |= A. Since T I is a set of atoms whose unique model is I , every nontrivial
atom true in I belongs to T I . Since A is a nontrivial atom that doesn’t belong to T I , we
can conclude that A is false in I .
Proof in the other direction is similar. ✷
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8.7. Proof of Proposition 7Proposition 7. For any transition 〈s, e, s′〉, s and s′ are states.
Proof. Let X = 0:s ∪ 0:e∪ 1:s′ be a model of D1. We need to show that 0:s and 0:s′ are
models of D0. By i :σ fl we denote the set of constants of the form i :c where c ∈ σ fl .
To show that 0 : s is a model of D0, observe that D0 is the part of D1 consisting of
rules (54) for static laws with i = 0 and rules (56). The reduct DX0 is a set of formulas
over 0 :σ fl and every formula from DX1 with a constant from 0 :σ fl belongs to DX0 . Since
X is the unique model of DX1 , we can conclude that 0 :s is the unique model of DX0 . But
DX0 =D0:s0 , so that 0:s is a model of D0.
Next we show that 0 :s′ is a model of D0. Let T be the part of D1 consisting of rules
(54) for static laws with i = 1, rules (54) for action dynamic laws with i = 0, and rules
(55) with i = 0. Let Γ = T X . It is straightforward to verify that Γ is a set of formulas over
1 :σ fl and that every formula from DX1 with a constant from 1 :σ fl belongs to Γ . Since X
is the unique model of DX1 , we can conclude that 1:s′ is the unique model of Γ . Let Γ0 be
the set of formulas over 0 :σ fl obtained from Γ by replacing each time stamp 1 : with 0 :.
Then 0:s′ is the unique model of Γ0. We need to show that 0:s′ is also the unique model of
D0:s ′0 . Observe first that every formula in D
0:s ′
0 that does not belong to Γ0 is an atom from
0 :s′ that came to the reduct from one of the rules (56) of D0. Hence 0 :s′ satisfies D0:s ′0 .
Due to the presence of rules (56) in D0, any interpretation that satisfies D0:s ′0 must agree
with 0 : s′ on simple fluent constants. On the other hand, the formulas in Γ0 that do not
belong to D0:s ′0 do not contain statically determined constants, because their counterparts
in Γ came from the heads of dynamic laws. Consequently any interpretation that satisfies
D0:s ′0 must agree with 0:s′ on statically determined fluent constants. It follows that 0:s′ is
the unique model of D0:s ′0 , so that 0:s′ is a model of D0. ✷
8.8. Proof of Proposition 8
Proposition 8. For any m > 0, an interpretation (58) of the signature of Dm is a model
of Dm iff each triple 〈si , ei, si+1〉 (0 i < m) is a transition.
Proof. We understand the notation i :σ fl as in the previous proof, and the meaning of
i :σ act is similar.
Take a model X of Dm, represent it in the form (58), and take any j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}.
We need to show that 0:sj ∪ 0:ej ∪ 1:sj+1 is a model of D1.
Let T be the subset of Dm consisting of rules (54) for static laws with i = j + 1, rules
(54) for action dynamic laws with i = j , and rules (55) with i = j . Let Γ = T X . It is
straightforward to verify that Γ is a set of formulas over j :σ act ∪ j +1:σ fl, and that every
formula from DXm with a constant from j :σ act ∪ j + 1 :σ fl belongs to Γ . Since X is the
unique model of DXm , it follows that j :ej ∪ j +1:sj+1 is the unique model of Γ . Let Γ0 be
the set of formulas over 0:σ act∪ 1:σ fl obtained from Γ by replacing j : with 0: and j +1:
with 1:. Then 0:ej ∪ 1:sj+1 is the only interpretation of 0:σ act ∪ 1:σ fl that satisfies Γ0.
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The proof of the previous proposition is easily adapted to show that sj is a state,
which is to say that 0 : sj is a model of D0. That is, 0 : sj is the unique model of
D
0:sj
0 =D
0:sj∪ 0:ej∪ 1:sj+1
0 .
It remains to observe that D0:sj∪ 0:ej∪ 1:sj+10 ∪ Γ0 = D
0:sj∪ 0:ej∪ 1:sj+1
1 , so that 0 : sj∪0 :ej ∪ 1 :sj+1 is the unique model of this set of formulas, and, consequently, a model
of D1.
For the other direction, assume that, for each j ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}, the triple 〈sj , ej , sj+1〉
is a transition. We need to show that the corresponding interpretation X of form (58) is a
model of Dm.
For each j , let Tj be the subset of Dm consisting of rules (54) for static laws with
i = j + 1, rules (54) for action dynamic laws with i = j , and rules (55) with i = j . Notice
that Dm =D0 ∪ T0 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm−1. Let Γj = T Xj . Of course DXm =DX0 ∪ Γ0 ∪ · · · ∪ Γm−1.
For any such j , since 〈sj , ej , sj+1〉 is a transition, 0:sj ∪ 0:ej ∪ 1:sj+1 is the unique
model of D0:sj ∪ 0:ej ∪ 1:sj+11 = D
0:sj
0 ∪ T
0:sj ∪ 0:ej ∪ 1:sj+1
0 . Reasoning much as before, it
follows that 0:ej ∪ 1:sj+1 is the unique model T 0:sj ∪ 0:ej ∪ 1:sj+10 . This is equivalent to
saying that j :ej ∪ j + 1:sj+1 is the unique model T j :sj ∪ j :ej ∪ j+1:sj+1j = Γj .
From the previous proposition, we can conclude also that 0 : s0 is the unique model
of DX0 .
Finally, since DXm =DX0 ∪Γ0∪ · · ·∪Γm−1, we can conclude that X is the unique model
of DXm , and thus a model of Dm. ✷
8.9. Proof of Proposition 9
Proposition 9. If
(i) every constant in R is statically determined, and
(ii) for every causal law in D that contains a constant from R in the head, all constants
occurring in this law belong to R,
then the mapping I → IR is a 1–1 correspondence between the models of Dm and the
models of DRm .
Proof. Using the fact that s′(c)= s(c) for every c ∈R and for every transition 〈s, e, s′〉, it
is easy to verify that if I is a model of Dm, then IR is a model of DRm. In other words, the
mapping I → IR is a function from the set of models of Dm into the set of models of DRm .
It is also easy to see that the function is 1–1. It remains to show that the function is onto.
Take any model J of DRm. Define the interpretation I of the signature of Dm as follows:
I (i :c)=
{
J (c) if c ∈R,
J (i :c) otherwise.
Then
I (0:c)= · · · = I (m:c) (76)
for all c ∈ R, and IR = J . We will check that I is a model of Dm, that is to say, the only
model of DIm.
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For any formula F of the signature of Dm, let FR be the result of dropping the time
stamps in front of all constants from R in F . It is easy to see that I satisfies a formula F
iff J satisfies FR . It follows that(
DRm
)J = {FR: F ∈DIm}. (77)
Since J is a model of (DRm)J , it follows that I is a model of DIm. It remains to show that
DIm has no other models.
Take any model I1 of DIm. By (77), IR1 is a model of (DRm)J . Since J is the only model
of (DRm)J , IR1 = J . Let i0 be a number from {0, . . . ,m}. Define the interpretation I2 of the
signature of Dm as follows:
I2(i :c)=
{
I1(i0 :c) if c ∈ R,
I1(i :c) otherwise.
We want to show that I2 is a model of DIm as well. Since I1 is a model of DIm, I2
satisfies all formulas from DIm that do not contain constants from R. Consider a formula
from DIm that contains at least one constant from R. Since all constants in R are statically
determined, this formula has the form i : F for some static causal law (52) in D and some
time stamp i such that I satisfies i : G. By condition (ii), all constants occurring in F ,
G belong to R. For every constant c from R, I assigns to i :c and i0 :c the same value;
consequently, I satisfies i0 : G, so that i0 : F belongs to DIm. It follows that I1 satisfies
i0 : F . Since I2 does not differ from I1 on the constants occurring in this formula, it follows
that I2 satisfies i0 : F . For every constant c from R, I2 assigns to i :c and i0 :c the same
value; consequently, I2 satisfies i : F . We have established that I2 indeed satisfies DIm.
In view of this fact, it follows from (77) that IR2 satisfies (DRm)J . We can conclude that
IR2 = J . So, for every c ∈ R, I2(0 :c)= J (c), and consequently I1(i0 :c)= J (c). Since i0
was arbitrary, we have proved that
I1(0:c)= · · · = I1(m:c) (78)
for every c ∈ R. And since IR = J = IR1 , it follows from (76) and (78) that I1 = I . This
shows that DIm has no models other than I . ✷
8.10. Proof of Proposition 10
A (propositional) default theory is a set of defaults of the form
F :G1, . . . ,Gk
H
(79)
where each of F,G1, . . . ,Gk,H is a classical propositional formula and k  0. If
formula F in (79) is , it is often omitted. If in addition k = 0, we identify the default (79)
with the formula H .
Let D be a default theory and E a logically closed set of classical formulas. By DE we
denote the reduct of D relative to E, defined as follows.
DE =
{
F
H
: for some default (79) in D, none of ¬G1, . . . ,¬Gk belong to E
}
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E is an extension for D if E is the least logically closed set of classical formulas such that
for every F
H
∈DE if F ∈E then H ∈E.
Where appropriate below, we identify an interpretation I with the set of formulas true
in it, and we identify a causal rule F ⇐G with the default :G
F
.
Proposition 10. Let T be a causal theory of a Boolean signature. An interpretation I is a
model of T iff I is an extension for T in the sense of default logic.
Proof. Let I be an interpretation. Notice that for any formula G, I |=G iff ¬G /∈ I . It
follows that the reduct of causal theory T relative to I is the same as the reduct of default
theory T relative to I . It remains to observe that I is the unique model of T I iff I is the
least logically closed set of formulas that contains T I , that is to say, iff I is an extension
for T . ✷
8.11. Proof of Proposition 11
Here we are concerned with a different class of logic programs than in the proof of
Proposition 3. These programs consist of rules of the form (68). For such programs, there
is a well-known correspondence between answer sets and the extensions of a corresponding
default theory, obtained by replacing each logic programming rule (68) with the default
: l1, . . . , ln
l0
[11, Section 5]. We are interested in a special case of this correspondence. For convenience,
where appropriate, we identify an interpretation with either the set of literals true in it or
the set of formulas true in it. Under this convention, we can observe that an interpretation I
is an answer set for a logic program whose rules have form (68) iff I is an extension for
the corresponding default theory.
Proposition 11. Let T be a causal theory whose rules have the form (67). An
interpretation I is a model of T iff I is an answer set for T in the sense of logic pro-
gramming.
Proof. In light of the previous observation, Proposition 11 follows from Proposi-
tion 10. ✷
9. Conclusion: elaboration tolerant representations of action domains
Elaboration tolerance is a property of knowledge representation formalisms described
by John McCarthy [31] as follows:
A formalism is elaboration tolerant to the extent that it is convenient to modify
a set of facts expressed in the formalism to take into account new phenomena or
changed circumstances. . .Human-level AI will require representations with much more
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elaboration tolerance than those used by present AI programs, because human-level AI
needs to be able to take new phenomena into account.
The simplest kind of elaboration is the addition of new formulas. Next comes
changing the values of parameters. Adding new arguments to functions and predicates
represents more of a change.
Achieving a high degree of elaboration tolerance was one of our primary goals in the
design of the formalisms described in this paper—the language of causal theories, action
language C+ and the input language of the Causal Calculator. If the description of an ac-
tion domain in one of these languages needs to be enhanced to reflect additional effects of
an action or additional restrictions on its executability, this can be accomplished by adding
postulates. Any postulate can be partially or completely retracted by adding other postu-
lates, provided that it is expressed in a defeasible form. Adding new arguments to the name
of an action can be often replaced by adding postulates describing attributes of that action.
Finding ways to further increase the degree of elaboration tolerance of languages for
describing actions is a topic for future work.
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Appendix A. Reducing multi-valued formulas to classical formulas
If we disregard the internal structure of atoms c= v of a multi-valued propositional
signature σ (Section 2.1) then any formula of this signature becomes a classical formula,
and it can be evaluated relative to any truth-valued function on the set of atoms. To find
a model of a set X of formulas of signature σ means to find a truth-valued function I on
the set of atoms that is a model of X in the sense of classical propositional logic and has
the following additional property: for each c ∈ σ there exists a unique v ∈ Dom(c) such
that I (c = v)= t. This property can be expressed by saying that I satisfies the formulas∨
v
c= v ∧
∧
v =w
¬(c= v ∧ c=w) (A.1)
for all c ∈ σ . Consequently, to find a model of X means to find a model of the union of X
with formulas (A.1) in the sense of classical propositional logic.
If some constants in σ are Boolean then the translation to classical propositional logic
can be made more economical: for a Boolean constant c, we can replace every occurrence
of c = f with ¬c, drop the corresponding formula (A.1), and then drop c = f from the set
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of atoms. For instance, the models of (17) can be computed without adding any of the
formulas (A.1) if we rewrite (17) in the form
p ≡ q,
¬p ≡⊥,
q ≡ q,
¬q ≡¬q.
A similar simplification can be used for any constant with a two-element domain.
The number of conjunctive terms
¬(c= v ∧ c=w) (v =w) (A.2)
in formula (A.1) is quadratic in the cardinality of Dom(c), which makes this formula
computationally unattractive when the domain of c is large. Instead of (A.2), we can use a
definitional extension of this set of formulas whose size is linear in the number of elements
v1, . . . , vn of Dom(c):
p1 ≡ c= v1 ¬(p1 ∧ c= v2)
p2 ≡ p1 ∨ c= v2 ¬(p2 ∧ c= v3)
· · · · · ·
pn−1 ≡ pn−2 ∨ c= vn−1 ¬(pn−1 ∧ c= vn)
where p1, . . . , pn−1 are new Boolean constants.
Appendix B. Abbreviations for causal laws
(1) A static law or an action dynamic law of the form
caused F if 
can be written as
caused F.
(2) A fluent dynamic law of the form
caused F if  after H
can be written as
caused F after H.
(3) A static law of the form
caused ⊥ if ¬F
can be written as
constraint F.
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(4) A fluent dynamic law of the form
caused ⊥ if ¬F after G
can be written as
constraint F after G.
(5) An expression of the form
rigid c
where c is a fluent constant stands for the set of causal laws
constraint c= v after c= v
for all v ∈Dom(c).
(6) A fluent dynamic law of the form
caused ⊥ after ¬F
can be written as
always F.
(7) A fluent dynamic law of the form
caused ⊥ after F ∧G
where F is an action formula can be written as
nonexecutable F if G. (B.1)
(8) An expression of the form
F causes G if H (B.2)
where F is an action formula stands for the fluent dynamic law
caused G after F ∧H
if G is a fluent formula,10 and for the action dynamic law
caused G if F ∧H
if G is an action formula.
(9) An expression of the form
default F if G (B.3)
stands for the causal law
caused F if F ∧G.
10 It is clear that the expression in the previous line is a fluent dynamic law only when G does not contain
statically determined constants. Similar remarks can be made in connection with many of the abbreviations
introduced below.
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(10) An expression of the form
default F if G after H
stands for the fluent dynamic law
caused F if F ∧G after H.
The part
if G
in this abbreviation can be dropped if G is .
(11) An expression of the form
exogenous c if G (B.4)
where c is a constant stands for the set of causal laws
default c= v if G
for all v ∈Dom(c).
(12) An expression of the form
F may cause G if H (B.5)
where F is an action formula stands for the fluent dynamic law
default G after F ∧H
if G is a fluent formula, and for the action dynamic law
default G if F ∧H
if G is an action formula.
(13) An expression of the form
inertial c if G (B.6)
where c is a fluent constant stands for the set of fluent dynamic laws
default c= v after c= v ∧G
for all v ∈Dom(c).
(14) If any of the abbreviations (B.2)–(B.6) ends with
if 
then this part of the expression can be dropped.
(15) The expression obtained by appending
unless c
where c is a Boolean statically determined fluent constant to a static law
caused F if G (B.7)
stands for the pair of static laws
caused F if G∧¬c, (B.8)
default ¬c.
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(16) The expression obtained by appending
unless c
where c is a Boolean action constant to an action dynamic law (B.7) stands for the
pair of action dynamic laws (B.8).
(17) The expression obtained by appending
unless c
where c is a Boolean action constant to a fluent dynamic law
caused F if G after H
stands for the pair of dynamic laws
caused F if G after H ∧¬c,
default ¬c.
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